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Abstract
The use of linear wholesale price contract has long been recognized as a threat to achieving
channel e±ciency. Many formats of nonlinear pricing contract have been proposed to
achieve vertical channel coordination. Examples include two-part tari® and quantity
discount. A two-part tari® charges the downstream party a ¯xed fee for participation
and a uniform unit price. A quantity discount contract does not include a ¯xed fee and
c h a r g e sal o w e ru n i tp r i c ef o re a c ha d d i t i o n al unit. Extant economic theories predict
these contracts, when chosen optimally, to be revenue and division equivalent in that
they all restore full channel e±ciency and give the same surplus to the upstream party
assuming constant relative bargaining power. We conduct a laboratory experiment to
test the empirical equivalence of the two pricing formats.
Surprisingly, both pricing formats fail to coordinate the channel even in a well-controlled
market environment with subjects motivated by signi¯cant monetary incentives. The
observed channel e±ciencies were signi¯cantly lower than 100%. In fact, they are statis-
tically no better than that of the linear wholesale price contract. Revenue equivalence
fails because the quantity discount scheme achieves a higher channel e±ciency than the
two-part tari®. Also, division equivalence does not hold because the quantity discount
scheme accords a higher surplus to the upstream party than the two-part tari®.
To account for the observed empirical regularities, we allow the downstream party to
have a reference-dependent utility in which the upfront ¯xed fee is framed as loss and
the subsequent contribution margin as gain. The proposed model nests the standard
economic model as a special case with a loss aversion coe±cient of 1.0. The estimated
loss aversion coe±cient is 1.6, thereby rejecting the standard model. We rule out other
plausible explanations such as parties having fairness concerns and non-linear risk atti-
tudes.
Keywords: Pricing Format, Two-Part Tari®, Quantity Discount, Channel E±ciency,
Double Marginalization, Reference-Dependent Utility.1
1 Introduction
A classical problem in vertical control is the so-called \Double-Marginalization" (DM)
problem (Spengler, 1950). The market setting is one in which an upstream party sells
a product to a downstream party that in turn serves a group of customers. Both par-
ties must decide independently the prices at which these transactions occur in order to
maximize their own pro¯ts. If the upstream party is restricted to employ a linear price
at which the product is transferred, then it can be shown that the total pro¯t of the
two parties is less than that of an integrated channel in which both parties coordinate
their prices to maximize their total pro¯t. This ine±ciency occurs because the upstream
party fails to account for the externality of its pricing decision on the downstream party's
pro¯t. Consequently, the downstream party over-prices relative to the e±cient level that
would occur in the integrated channel. The phenomenon is persistent even if the demand
is nonlinear and the marginal cost of production is not constant.
Many theoretical solutions have been proposed to address this problem (Tirole, 1988).
They all involve the upstream party using a more sophisticated pricing format to in-
duce the downstream party to charge the e±cient price in order to restore full channel
e±ciency.2 A straightforward way to accomplish this is to have the upstream party con-
trol the price at which the downstream party can charge. This price ¯xing scheme is
frequently called resale-price maintenance, which can be legally problematic in the US.
Equivalently, the upstream party can impose a minimum resale quantity on the down-
stream party. If this minimum is set to the e±cient quantity in the integrated channel,
the downstream party will charge the e±cient price and full e±ciency is restored. Both
schemes however involve direct interference with the downstream party's pricing decision.
There are two other ways to eliminate DM problem without direct control of the
downstream party's pricing decision. First, the upstream party can use a two-part tari®
pricing structure: charge a ¯xed fee for participation (F) and a uniform price (w)p e r
unit sold. The total revenue to the upstream party is then F +w ¢q where q is the total
quantity sold. Second, a quantity discount scheme can be designed such that the total
2Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) show that with product non-speci¯ability, demand uncertainty, unob-
servability of retailer behavior, costless ex-post negotiation, and late product delivery (after demand
realization), the equilibrium contract is a uniform wholesale price contract.2
revenue to the upstream party is identical to that given in the two-part tari® structure
if the downstream party is charged a unit price given by
F+w¢q
q for a sales quantity q.3
Note that the quantity discount scheme presented here is identical to the two-part tari®
structure because the former is simply a reframing of the latter in terms of average cost
instead of total cost. If w is set to the marginal cost of the upstream party (i.e., there
is only one margin in the channel instead of two margins), then the downstream party
would want to set the price at the e±cient level. The upstream party can then divide
the surplus between the two parties by appropriately setting the ¯xed fee F taking into
account the reservation utility for participation of the downstream party.
The channel coordinating pricing contracts make three sharp predictions. First, they
predict that the more complex price contracts restore full channel e±ciency. As discussed
before, this is accomplished by inducing the downstream party to charge the e±cient
price. Second, a weaker form of full channel e±ciency prediction is to require these
contracts to generate the same channel pro¯ts for both parties. Third, they predict that
the division of the surplus is identical in all pricing formats as long as the downstream
party's reservation utility is kept constant across pricing formats. We call the ¯rst the Full
E±ciency Property,t h es e c o n dt h eRevenue Equivalence Property and the third Division
Equivalence Property. Whether these properties hold is an open empirical question. If
they do, the upstream party should be indi®erent to any of the pricing formats. If they do
not, it will be interesting to know which format is more e±cient, and which one bene¯ts
the upstream party the most. In this paper, we provide the ¯rst experimental test to the
Full E±ciency, Revenue Equivalence and Division Equivalence properties.
We run an economic experiment with three treatment conditions: 1) linear price (LP),
2) two-part tari® (TPT), and 3) quantity discount scheme (QD) as discussed above. Each
treatment condition has about 24 subjects acting as either upstream or downstream party
playing the above channel game with linear demand and constant marginal cost. Subjects
are motivated by monetary incentives to make optimal decisions. The key results are:
3Other quantity discount schemes are possible. For example, we can have a two-block tari® where a
linear price is charged up to a threshold quantity and then a di®erent linear price is used for any excess
above this threshold. Another commonly used scheme is the all units discount contract. Under this
scheme, di®erent common unit prices are used for all units depending on the quantity bought.3
1. TPT and QD do not restore full channel e±ciency. In fact, their channel e±ciency
are statistically no better than LP.
2. TPT and QD are not revenue equivalent. QD generates a statistically higher surplus
than TPT.
3. TPT and QD are not division equivalent. QD gives a higher fraction of channel
surplus to the upstream party than TPT.
All these experimental results run counter to the standard theoretical predictions.
To account for these results, we propose a behavioral model in which the downstream
party has a reference-dependent utility and the upstream party strategically takes this
into account in designing the pricing formats. We estimate the behavioral model on the
experimental data and show that $1 of ¯xed fee payment out°ow (an initial loss) needs
to be compensated by $1.6 of contribution margin in°ow (a subsequent gain) to make
the downstream party indi®erent. In addition, the reservation utility of the downstream
party is estimated to be 8%-14% of the integrated channel surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the standard economic
theory about channel coordinating pricing contracts and formulates the corresponding
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experimental design and Section 4 reports the main
results. Section 5 develops an extended model and estimate it on the experimental data.
Section 6 rules out a set of competing explanations for the observed results. Section 7
concludes the paper and suggests future research directions.
2 Channel Coordination and Pricing Formats
In this section we review the standard economic theory on vertical control. We describe
two pricing formats and explain how they help to achieve channel coordination. We then
derive the empirical implications and develop hypotheses based on the standard theory.
We consider a simple one-manufacturer-one-retailer channel. The manufacturer, an
upstream monopolist, produces a product at a constant marginal cost c.T h e m a n u -
facturer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, specifying a uniform wholesale price w,t oa4
retailer, who is a monopolist in the downstream market. The retailer sells the product
to end consumers at a retail price p. The retailer incurs no additional selling costs. De-
mand is assumed to be linear, taking the form of q = d ¡ p,w h e r ed is the choke-o®
demand and is assumed to be greater than c. This is a one-shot game in which there is
no inventory and the quantity sold to consumers is equal to the volume purchased from
the manufacturer.
If the channel is integrated, a retail price p should be chosen to maximize the total
channel pro¯t given by ¼(p)=( p ¡ c) ¢ q =( p ¡ c) ¢ (d ¡ p). It follows that the channel
pro¯t maximizing retail price equals d+c




4 . The manufacturer and the retailer can then negotiate a transfer
price w to divide the total channel pro¯t.
If the channel is not integrated, the manufacturer and the retailer independently
choose their respective prices (w and p) to maximize their own pro¯ts. In this set up, the
manufacturer moves ¯rst by o®ering a wholesale price w. Consequently, the retailer faces
ap r o ¯ to f¼R(p)=( p ¡ w)(d ¡ p) and responds by choosing a pro¯t maximizing retail
price d+w
2 . Rationally expecting the retailer's reaction, the manufacturer chooses a w to
maximize a pro¯t of ¼M(w)=( w¡c)¢(d¡ d+w
2 ). The pro¯t maximizing wholesale price
equals to d+c
2 >c , inducing a retail price of 3d+c
4 , which exceeds the e±cient price level
of d+c
2 . Consequently, the manufacturer ends up with a pro¯t of
(d¡c)2
8 and the retailer
earns
(d¡c)2
16 . The total pro¯t realized in this channel thus shrinks to
3(d¡c)2
16 ,r e p r e s e n t i n g
only 75% of the integrated channel pro¯t. The ine±ciency stems from the double price
distortion which occurs when the two ¯rms stack their price-cost margins, thus the term
\double marginalization".
The manufacturer can impose some vertical restraints to solve the double-marginalization
problem. For instance, the \resale-price maintenance" provision in a retail contract can
directly stipulate the e±cient retail price. Alternatively, a \quantity forcing" contract
speci¯es the minimum sales quota that the reta i l e rm u s ta c h i e v e .I ft h i sq u o t ai ss e tt o
the integrated channel sales quantity, the retailer is forced to choose the e±cient price
level. Both contracts involve the manufacturer directly interfering with the retailer's
pricing decision.
A less \intrusive" solution to the double-marginalization problem is to use a more5
complex pricing contract like the two-part tari®. Here, the manufacturer asks for a
franchise fee F and charges a ¯xed marginal wholesale price w. If a retailer buys a
quantity q, it incurs a total cost of wq + F. The retailer thus faces a pro¯t of ¼R(p)=
(p ¡ w)(d ¡ p) ¡ F. It follows that the best-responding retail price equals d+w
2 ,w i t ht h e
corresponding retailer pro¯t being
(d¡w)2
4 ¡F. The manufacturer can set the franchise fee
up to
(d¡w)2
4 depending on the reservation utility of the retailer.4 If the retailer has zero
reservation utility, the manufacturer's optimization problem becomes max0·w·d ¼M =
(w ¡ c)(d ¡ d+w
2 )+
(d¡w)2
4 . In equilibrium, w = c, inducing a retail price of d+c
2 ,w h i c hi s
at the e±cient level. The resulting channel pro¯t is
(d¡c)2
4 , which is the same as that of an
integrated channel. If the retailer's reservation utility is not zero, the manufacturer will
have to lower the franchise fee to accommodate the retailer's positive reservation utility.
The central result however remains the same: w = c is essential to achieving full channel
e±ciency. The basic idea is to eliminate one of the two margins. Here, the manufacturer
sets its price margin to zero and uses the franchise fee to gain its share of the surplus.
As a result, the retailer faces the same margin of p ¡ c as an integrated channel does.
The price distortion is therefore removed, and channel e±ciency restored.
Instead of a two-part tari®, a quantity discount contract can also be used to solve
the double marginalization problem. One possible quantity discount scheme speci¯es an
average unit wholesale price of F
q + w,w h e r eF and w are some nonnegative constants,
and q is the total amount bought by the retailer. The more the retailer buys, the lower
its average cost. It can be seen that this price contract is equivalent to two-part tari®:
for both contracts the total cost to the retailer is F + wq for a given q.H e n c e t h i s
quantity discount scheme can be viewed as the average-cost version of a two-part tari®.
Consequently, the same reasoning as in the two-part tari® applies here: If w = c,t h e
retailer would want to charge the retail price at the e±cient level. The manufacturer can
then divide the surplus between the two parties by appropriately setting F taking into
account the retailer's reservation utility for participation.
These pricing formats lead to three sharp theoretical predictions about the channel
outcome. First, it is predicted that channel e±ciency will be restored if the manufacturer
is allowed to use these more complex (than linear price) pricing formats. That is, they
4In the experiments, the retailer can choose not to participate in the channel. Based on their partic-
ipation decision, we empirically estimate the reservation utility of the retailer in Section 5.6
all achieve 100% of the integrated channel e±ciency. Second, a weakened form of the
¯rst prediction is that the two price formats are revenue equivalent in that they lead to
the same channel pro¯t. Third, it is predicted that the division of the surplus is identical
in two formats as long as the retailer's reservation utility is the same. We call the ¯rst
the Full E±ciency Property, the second the Revenue Equivalence Property and the third
Division Equivalence Property. Whether these properties hold is still an open empirical
question.
In this paper, we directly test the above predictions in a controlled lab environment.
W ef o c u so u ra t t e n t i o no nt w o - p a r tt a r i ®a n di ts quantity-discount variation because
the two bare immediate mathematical equivalence. We thus include three treatment
conditions in our experiment: 1) Linear price (LP) contract, 2) two-part tari® (TPT),
and 3) quantity discount (QD). The LP condition serves as the benchmark: It helps
to verify whether the double-marginalization problem indeed exists, and to what extent
TPT and QD alleviate the problem.
The above theoretical predictions are recast in the following hypotheses:












¼M(QD)+¼R(QD) = ®, 0 · ® · 1.
We can illustrate the above three hypotheses pictorially by Figure 1. The ¯gure
plots the manufacturer's pro¯t as a function of the retailer's pro¯t. In the ¯gure, we
have d =1 0 ,c = 2, so that the maximum channel surplus is 16. The full e±ciency
property requires that all pro¯t pairs of TPT and QD fall on line A, which is given by
¼M + ¼R = 16. The revenue equivalence property implies that all pro¯t pairs of the
contract forms fall on any line parallel to A given by ¼M + ¼R = K; 0 <K· 16 (Line7
B is one such example where K = 14). Framing the hypotheses this way allows one
to see that the revenue equivalence property is implied by the full e±ciency property.
Also, both properties require that the surplus transfer between the manufacturer and the
retailer must be e±cient (every dollar given up by one party must be gained by another
party and there is no loss) for both properties to hold since they both predict the slope to
be -1.0. The division equivalence property requires that all pro¯t pairs of both contract
forms fall on a line that passes through the origin. Line C is an example with slope =
1:0. Note that the standard economic theory predicts that all three properties hold and
hence it implies that all pro¯t pairs for either contract form fall on the same point E. We
shall later test the three hypotheses by running regressions of manufacturer pro¯ts over
retailer pro¯ts and checking a set of restrictions on the coe±cients.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Decision Task
As discussed before, we want to give the standard theory the best shot by testing it in the
simplest possible market environment. If a theory fails in the laboratory environment,
which isolates the simplest features and limits naturally-occurring complications, then
the failure raises doubts about how well the theory will apply in a more complex setting.
The laboratory market environment involves a manufacturer and retailer pair facing a
linear end consumer demand given by q =1 0¡ p.T h em a r g i n a lc o s tc is set to 2. The
task of the subjects is to act either as a manufacturer or a retailer and to choose either
wholesale price contract or retail price to maximize their pro¯ts (which are converted to
monetary payo®s).
TABLE 1 shows the theoretical predictions under the LP, TPT, and QD treatment
conditions. LP predicts a wholesale price of 6, a retail price of 8, and a total channel
pro¯t of 12. TPT and QD, on the other hand, make the same predictions of a wholesale
price of 2, a retail price of 6, and a total channel pro¯t of 16. Note that Full E±ciency
Property is achieved under TPT and QD. Revenue Equivalence and Division Properties
hold since TPT and QD generate the same pro¯t for both parties.8
3.2 Experimental Procedure
A total of six experimental sessions were run, two for each treatment condition. Seventy-
¯ve undergraduate students at a western university participated in the experiment.5 Most
experimental session had 12 subjects and each session always consisted of 11 decision
rounds. Each subject played the game 11 times.6 This design allowed a subject to play
against each other subject anonymously and at most once. Each session lasted for one
and a half hours. Subjects earned an average payment of $14. Before the experiment
began, subjects were given a quiz to make sure that they understood the decision task.
A copy of the instruction for the TPT treatment condition is given in Appendix B.
We simpli¯ed the decision task as much as possible. For example, a table was given to
depict the linear demand under di®erent integer price points. The anonymous matching
of subjects was intended to avoid any communication between subjects. Since each
subject was matched with a di®erent partner in each round, we controlled for collusion,
reciprocity, and reputation building behaviors. Therefore, each round could be framed
as a one-shot game with a new partner.
In each round, subjects were randomly assigned to be either RED (manufacturer) or
BLUE (retailer). Under the LP condition, the RED player moved ¯rst and chose a RED
PRICE w ( a ni n t e g e rb e t w e e n0a n d1 0 )a tw h i c hs h es o l dh e rp r o d u c tt ot h eB L U E
player. The administrator passed the information on w to the corresponding BLUE
player. The BLUE player made her decisions in two stages. First, she must decide
whether or not to accept the pricing contract given by the manufacturer. If the BLUE
player chose to participate, she chose a BLUE PRICE p ( a ni n t e g e rb e t w e e n0a n d1 0 )
5It is common to use undergraduates to test theories of industrial organization (see Holt, 1995). The
results could in principle be replicated with managers. Several previous studies comparing professionals
and students ¯nd little di®erence between the two groups (see Plott, 1987, and Ball and Cech 1996).
Alternatively, one could use student subjects with di®erent levels of experience with the task to assess
whether experts behave di®erently from novices (e.g., Jung, Kagel, and Levin 1994). Note that the
downstream party can also be a end customer (e.g., a customer who has to choose between alternative
cell phone plans). So the results reported here are relevant for business-to-customer markets as well.
6In one session only 11 subjects showed up. In order to ensure unrepeated matching, we had each
subject play the game 10 times with one subject sitting still in each round. In another session 16 subjects
participated, and each subject played 11 times only.9
at which she sold the product to a group of consumers behaving according to the linear
demand function. If the BLUE player quitted, then the round ended and both players
earned 0 point. Otherwise the quantity q sold was determined according to a simple table
where q =1 0¡ p. For each unit sold, the RED player earned (w ¡ 2) points and the
BLUE player earned (p ¡ w) points. Each player's total point earnings for that round
were calculated as the unit point earnings multiplied by q. At the end of the session,
point earnings for all rounds were summed up and redeemed for cash payment at the
rate of $0.20 per point.
The procedures were similar in the TPT condition, except that the RED player had
to choose both a RED PRICE w and a lump-sum FIXED FEE F she would ask from
BLUE. Again the BLUE player made her decisions in two stages. If the BLUE player
rejected the o®er and chose not to participate, then both players earned 0 for that round.
I fs h ec h o s et op a r t i c i p a t e ,s h ep a i da¯ x e df e ea n dc h o s ear e t a i lp r i c e .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e
RED player earned (w¡2)£q+F, and the BLUE player earned (p¡w)£q¡F,w h e r e
quantity sold q was determined in the same manner as before.
In QD condition, RED moved ¯rst and determined a price scheme to o®er BLUE.
Speci¯cally, the relationship between the average unit price (denoted by RED PRICE)
and the units sold by BLUE was represented by the formula w+ F
q ,w h e r ew corresponds
to the wholesale price and F corresponds to the franchise fee. The RED player's decision
then reduced to choosing the value for the coe±cients w and F,w h e r ew is required to
be an integer between 0 and 10, and F is an integer greater than or equal to 0. Then
similar to the other conditions, both players earned 0 if the BLUE player decided not
to participate. Otherwise, BLUE needed to decide on a BLUE PRICE p (an integer
between 0 and 10). BLUE's point earnings equaled to (p ¡ (w + F
q )) £ q,a n dR E D ' s
point earnings was (w + F
q ¡ 2) £ q.
4 Results
TABLE 2 and TABLE 3 show the subject decisions, the total surplus, and the division
of surplus. The t-statistics for testing the various hypotheses are reported in TABLE10
4a and TABLE 4b.7 As shown in TABLE 2, the wholesale price is higher than the
marginal cost of 2 in both TPT and QD conditions, contrary to the prediction of the
standard economic theory. The ¯xed franchise fee is also lower than 16 in both cases.
A high fraction of retailers (29% (TPT) and 17% (QD)) refuse to participate when
confronted with nonlinear pricing contracts. In the TPT and QD conditions, the retail
price is signi¯cantly higher than the optimal price of 6. The surplus for each condition
was lower than that predicted by the standard theory and the division of surplus varies
across nonlinear pricing contract conditions. We shall discuss these results in detail by
answering the following questions.
4.1 Does Double-Marginalization Problem Exist?
In order to test whether double marginalization exists, we can examine both the wholesale
and the retail prices under the LP condition. With d =1 0a n dc =2 ,t h ew h o l e s a l ep r i c e
w = 6 and the retail price p = 8 if double marginalization occurs. If the channel is
integrated, the predictions become w =2a n dp = 6 respectively. The average wholesale
price is 5.47, which is statistically di®erent from both 6 and 2 (see the top panel of
TABLE 4a). The average retail price is 7.75, which is di®erent from both the double-
marginalization level of 8 and the e±cient level of 6. Note that the wholesale and retail
prices are closer to the double-marginalization levels than the e±cient levels. The average
channel e±ciency is 72.95% overall, which is not statistically di®erent from the double
marginalization prediction (see top panel of TABLE 4b), but signi¯cantly lower than the
integrated e±ciency of 100%. Overall, we conclude that double-marginalization problem
does exist under the LP condition, as expected.
4.2 Does Full E±ciency Property Hold?
The unconditional channel e±ciency for TPT and QD are 66.71% and 77.04% respec-
tively. Statistically, they are no more e±cient than the LP condition. The channel
7We assume observations to be independent across time. In Section 5 we show that this assumption
is not rejected.11
e±ciency for TPT and QD are statistically less than 100% (see second panel of TABLE
4b). Conditional on retailer participation, both TPT and QD achieve a channel e±ciency
exceeding 90% (93.68% (TPT) and 93.29% (QD)). Note that these conditional channel
e±ciencies are signi¯cantly higher than the channel e±ciency in the LP condition. Thus,
TPT and QD do help alleviate the double-marginalization problem conditional on retailer
participation. However, full e±ciency is not achieved even conditional on participation.
As discussed above, a stronger test for the full e±ciency property is to check whether
the pro¯t pairs of both contract forms (conditional on participation) fall on the same line
A as given in Figure 1. We investigate this by regressing the retailer's pro¯t against the
manufacturer's pro¯t and testing whether the joint restriction that both the intercepts
a r e1 6a n dt h es l o p e sa r e1i sr e j e c t e d . N o t et h a tt h i st e s ti ss t r o n g e rt h a nt h et - t e s t
given in Table 4b because it also requires the surplus transfer between the manufacturer
and the retailer to be e±cient (i.e., the slope = ¡1:0). The Â2 statistic is 196.86 (p =
0.0000, dof = 4).
In sum, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
4.3 Does Revenue Equivalence Property Hold?
QD achieves a statistically higher level of channel e±ciency than TPT (77.04% versus
66.71%. See the third panel of TABLE 4b for t-statistics). Results from the wholesale
price and franchise fee explain why. QD has a lower wholesale price of 3.20 (versus
4.05 under TPT), a higher franchise fee of 7.45 (versus 4.61), and a lower quitting rate
of 17.42% (versus 28.79%). Since a lower wholesale price reduces the price distortion, it
helps alleviate the double-marginalization problem. Combined with a better participation
rate, this leads to a higher degree of channel e±ciency.
Again, we provide a stronger test of the revenue equivalence property by checking
whether ¼M + ¼R = K for both contract forms. This is done by regressing the retailer's
pro¯t against the manufacturer's pro¯t with the joint restriction that the slopes are -1.0
and the intercepts are identical but freely estimated. The Â2 statistic is 47.62 (p=0.0000,
dof=3).12
Overall, we conclude that hypothesis 2 is rejected and that TPT and QD are not
revenue equivalent. QD is superior to TPT in surplus generation.
4.4 Does Division Equivalence Property Hold?
To test the division equivalence property, we compute the ratio of manufacturer pro¯t
over actual total channel pro¯t, which measures the share of the entire pie captured by
the manufacturer. When the retailer refuses to participate in the trade and hence both
parties receive zero pro¯t, we assign the value of .5 to this measure. For the entire sample,
the manufacturer obtains an average share of 64.79% under QD, which is higher than
the share of 61.57% under TPT (see the bottom panel of TABLE 4b). Conditional on
retailer participation, both contracts lead to higher manufacturer share, being 67.91%
under QD and 66.25% under TPT. The di®erence in the shares across the two contracts
is not insigni¯cant however.
Again, we investigate the division equivalence property by checking whether ¼M =
®
1¡®¼R (see Hypothesis 3) for both contract forms. We regress the retailer's pro¯t against
the manufacturer's pro¯t with the joint restriction that the slopes are identical but freely
estimated and the intercepts are 0. The Â2 statistic is 4093.55 (p=0.0000, dof=3). This
result suggests that the division equivalence property is violated under the stronger test.
In sum, we can reject hypothesis 3.
5 A nE x t e n d e dM o d e l
Our experiment data run counter to the predictions given by standard economic theory.
The most puzzling empirical regularities are that the wholesale price is signi¯cantly
higher than the marginal cost c in the TPT and QD conditions, and that TPT has
a higher wholesale price than QD does. In this section, we attempt to account for
these empirical regularities by allowing the retailer to have a reference-dependent utility
function. Below, we develop a model of two-part tari® incorporating reference dependence
and loss aversion, next we estimate the model on the experiment data.13
5.1 Equilibrium with Loss Aversion
If the retailer uses the status quo as a reference point when it evaluates a two-part tari®
contract (TPT), the lump-sum ¯xed fee (F) represents an upfront loss regardless of the
sales quantity. In contrast, the subsequent contribution margin ((p¡w)¢q) is perceived
as a gain. If the retailer is loss averse, it may weigh the upfront loss more heavily than
the subsequent gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Put di®erently, the retailer creates
two separate mental accounts for the cash °ow and these accounts do not integrate dollar
for dollar (Thaler, 1985). This gain-loss dichotomy doesn't apply to the manufacturer
because the wholesale margin and the franchise fee are both gains.
If the same two-part tari® is presented as a quantity discount contract (QD), then
the reference-dependent e®ect disappears. In QD, no upfront ¯xed fee is required. The
retailer pays an average cost for any quantity bought. Consequently, the retailer only sees
the contribution margin component (i.e., there is no loss aversion in the QD condition).
We have the same model setup as before. The only di®erence is that we now allow the
retailer's utility to be reference dependent. We solve for the equilibrium using backwards
induction. After observing the wholesale price and franchise fee o®ered by the manufac-
turer, the retailer determines the best-response retail price if it is willing to accept the
o®er. A retail price p leads to the retailer pro¯t of ¼R =( p ¡ w)(d ¡ p) ¡ F. If retailer
is loss averse, she will maximize the reference-dependent utility given by8:
max
0·p·dUR =( p ¡ w)(d ¡ p) ¡ ¸F (5.1)
where ¸ ¸ 1 stands for the loss aversion coe±cient, which is typically de¯ned as the ratio
between the marginal disutility of losses (in absolute value) and the marginal utility of
gains. Let V ¸ 0 represent the reservation utility of the retailer, then the participation
constraint of the retailer is max 0·p·d UR ¸ V .
If UR is above V , the retailer accepts the o®er, otherwise she rejects it. Conditional on
8We assume the value function to be kinked at the reference point while linear over the gain/loss do-
main. We use the linear speci¯cation because it is mathematically tractable and amenable to econometric
estimation.14
accepting, the best-response retail price is p = d+w
2 , which is the same as in the standard
model since the franchise fee, whether weighted by ¸ or not, does not enter the retailer's
¯rst-order condition. The maximized retailer utility is UR =
(d¡w)2
4 ¡ ¸F.
On the manufacturer side, since both wholesale income and franchise fee contribute
positively to his well-being, they are weighted equally. Hence the manufacturer's utility
maximization is equivalent to the pro¯t maximization:
max
0·w·d;F¸0







¡ ¸F ¸ V (IR) (5.2)
We focus on the non-degenerate equilibrium by assuming V to be small enough such that
the manufacturer is always willing to stay in the business (i.e. assume the equilibrium
manufacturer pro¯t is nonnegative). The loss aversion coe±cient ¸ a®ects the franchise
fee through the IR constraint and therefore feeds into the ¯rst-order incentive structure
of the manufacturer. The equilibrium depends on ¸, as described in proposition 1. The
proof is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium channel decisions and outcomes are shown below as a





























Figure 2 plots the equilibrium predictions, where we set d =1 0 ,c =2 ,a n dV =2 .
The two dotted lines in each graph correspond to the the predictions of the integrated
channel and the double marginalization (\DM"). Note several interesting patterns. First,
the curves in all graphs cross the \integrated" line at ¸ = 1. That is, when gains and15
losses are symmetric, two-part tari® is fully e±cient in solving the double-marginalization
problem: the equilibrium wholesale price, retail price, quantity and total pro¯t are all at
the integrated level. The channel is e±ciently coordinated, with the channel pro¯t being
(d¡c)2
4 . Note that when ¸ = 1, the extended model reduces to the standard economic
models.
When ¸>1, wholesale price is above the marginal cost and is concave and increasing
in ¸. The ¯xed franchise fee, on the other hand, is decreasing and convex in ¸.R e t a i l
price and sales are above and below the optimal respectively. As ¸ increases, the franchise
fee becomes less e®ective as a channel coordination instrument and the manufacturer puts
less weight on it. That is, he shifts his source of income towards the sales margin and
h e n c es e t sah i g h e rw h o l e s a l ep r i c e . T h ec h a nnel e±ciency decreases with the degree
of loss aversion. Interestingly, loss aversion hurts the manufacturer, since both channel
pro¯t and the manufacturer's share in it decreases with ¸.
When ¸ !1 , all curves converge to the DM level: Franchise fee is no longer feasible,
and two-part tari® degenerates into a single instrument (linear price) contract.
5.2 Estimation
5.2.1 The TPT Model and QD Model
We estimate the proposed model on the experiment data using maximum likelihood
method. We use subject decisions (manufacturer's choices of F and w and retailer's
choice of whether to participate) to develop the likelihood function in order to estimate
the loss aversion coe±cient ¸ and the retailer reservation utility V .9
9There are two reasons why retail price is not included in the estimation: First, the retailer is best-
responding in price, hence the retail price can be viewed as a derived variable from the wholesale price
(note that the best-response retail price is a function of w given by p = 10+w
2 ). For both the TPT and
the QD conditions, t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the actual retail prices are equal to the
best-response retail prices (with p-values being .295 and .109 respectively). Hence, retail price adds little
new information to the estimation. Second, a separate estimation run including the actual retail price
led to roughly the same parameter estimates and slightly worse ¯t. Consequently, we did not include
actual retail price in the estimation.16

























where i =1 ;:::;I,a n dt =1 ;:::;T. I stands for the number of manufacturer-retailer
p a i r si ne a c hr o u n da n dT is the total number of rounds. w¤ and F ¤ are the equilibrium
values as prescribed in Proposition 1. The random errors of manufacturer decisions are
distributed normally with mean 0 and variance ¾2
w and ¾2
F respectively. These errors are
assumed to be identically and independently distributed.10 Since the same manufacturer
chooses the wholesale price and franchise fee simultaneously, they may be correlated. Let
½wF denote the correlation coe±cient.
The retailer's participation decision is incorporated into the likelihood function us-










4 ¡¸Fit is the utility that the retailer can best enjoy by choosing the
best responding price11. The retailer is willing to participate in the trade (quit =0 )i f
and only if the latent utility is greater than V .12 Therefore the probability for quitit =1
10In a separate estimation, we allowed w and F to follow an AR1 process. The resulting likelihood
value is only slightly improved. The carryover coe±cients for w and F are not signi¯cantly di®erent
from 0 at a .05 level. Consequently, we assume the errors to be independent across time as well as across
individuals.
11Alternatively, for the cases where the retailer does participate, actual retailer pro¯t can be used in-
stead of the best responding retailer pro¯t. Two approaches generate approximately the same estimates.
12We have also explored the case where retailer's reservation utility V evolves over time. We assume
a certain retailer's current reservation utility to be a weighted sum of its last period reservation utility
and last period actual utility. By this means, we allow the reservation utility to be heterogeneous across
retailers. We found that the weight put on the last period actual utility is not signi¯cantly di®erent
from 0. Also, there is neither signi¯cant improvement in model ¯t nor change in parameter estimates.
We thus conclude that retailer's reservation utility is reasonably constant and homogeneous in our data.17





, where © stands for the c.d.f. of the standard normal.
Assume the retailer's random utility errors to be independent of the manufacturer's
randomness in the choice of w and F, then the joint likelihood function is:





























+(1 ¡ quitit)log(1¡ ©
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The set of parameters are estimated with the Maximum Likelihood method. Note that
although our proposed model applies directly to TPT, we can also estimate it using data
from QD. We expect the loss aversion coe±cient ¸ estimated from QD to be smaller
however.
5.2.2 The LP Model
The LP model is estimated using the similar strategy. The set of relevant parameters
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where w¤ = d+c
2 .
5.3 Results
TABLE 5 presents the estimation results. A series of nested models are also estimated
and tested. The Â2 values for the Wald test and associated p-values are reported at the
bottom of each column.18
The most striking ¯nding is that the loss aversion coe±cient is signi¯cantly larger
t h a n1i nb o t hT P Ta n dQ D .A l ln e s t e dm o d e l sw i t ht h e¸ = 1 restriction are strongly
rejected. Interestingly, the estimated ¸ is 1.57 under TPT, and is 1.22 under QD. These
estimates imply that the pain in $1 increase in the franchise fee imposed on the retailer
can only be compensated by a $1.57 or $1.22 increase in her contribution margin. These
two estimates are signi¯cantly di®erent (Â2(1)=17.59, p=.000). Hence, loss aversion is
signi¯cantly weakened in the QD condition.
Our estimate of the loss aversion coe±cient ¸ (1.57 under TPT) is comparable to the
typical ¯nding in the literature. Bateman et al. (2004) report a loss-aversion for goods of
1.3 after controlling for loss-aversion of money. Hardie et al. (1993) ¯nd in a longitudinal
study of brand choice that the e®ect of price increases is 1.66 times that of price cuts.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) show that a coe±cient of about 2 can help resolve the equity
premium puzzle. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) ¯nd 2 to be the approximate ratio
of the slopes of the value function in loss and gain domains in riskless choice settings.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) report 2.29 as the mean ratio of selling prices to
buying prices in endowment e®ect experiments. Also, Chua and Camerer (2004) estimate
a slope coe±cient of 2.63 in savings contexts. Overall, these studies show a loss-aversion
coe±cient ranging from 1.3 to 2.6 with an average of about 2.0.
Another ¯nding is that retailer's reservation utility is positive in all three conditions,
b e i n g2 . 2 0u n d e rL P ,1 . 2 8u n d e rT P T ,a n d1 . 5 1u n d e rQ D .T h i sr e p r e s e n t sa b o u t8 % - 1 4 %
of the total pie of 16. Omitting retailer reservation utility leads to an over-estimation
for the loss aversion coe±cient. Speci¯cally, when the V = 0 restriction is imposed, the
estimated ¸ b e c o m e s1 . 7 5i nT P Ta n d1 . 3 5i nQ D .
There is a negative correlation between the random error term associated with w and
that associated with F. The correlation coe±cient is -.78 under TPT and -.91 under QD.
This suggests that a low wholesale price is accompanied by a high franchise fee and the
manufacturer shoots for a earning target in setting the parameters in the two-part tari®.
Put di®erently, the manufacturer treats the two contract instruments as substitutes.
TABLE 6 provides the ¯tted values of w, F, p and the rate of quitting based on the
behavioral model. As shown, the ¯tted values are close to the actual data, providing
direct support to the model.19
In sum, the standard economic model does not ¯t the experiment data well. We show
that the retailers are loss-averse and have a positive reservation utility. Consequently,
the two-part tari® cannot fully solve the double-marginalization problem. Accounting
for the retailer's loss aversion, the manufacturer o®ers a lower franchise fee and charges
a higher wholesale price. The degree of loss aversion can be substantially reduced by
reframing the two-part tari® contract as a quantity discount scheme. Hence quantity
discount is a more e±cient mechanism in solving the double-marginalization problem.
6 Competing Explanations
There are several potential competing explanations for the observed empirical regularities.
We examine and rule out three of them in this section.13
6.1 Fairness Concerns
Recently, research in behavioral economics has shown that people may not be completely
self-interested and may care about the well-being of others (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999). If the retailer cares about the manufacturer, she may cut the retail
price relative to the self-interested level to bene¯t the manufacturer. The manufacturer
therefore might not have to lower wholesale price w to marginal cost c in a two-part tari®
in order to induce the e±cient retail price. If this is true, fairness concerns might have
13We also rule out an additional explanation which is based on the complexity of a pricing contract. If
subjects are boundedly rational and dislike more complex contracts, then they may be more likely to quit
when faced with a more nonlinear contract. We measure nonlinearity by the ratio of the ¯xed fee (F)
and the marginal wholesale price (w) (which is proportional to the ratio of average and marginal costs).
If this is true, we would expect a smaller quitting rate for LP and a larger quit rate for TPT and QD.
Indeed, we observed a smaller quit rate for LP (6%). However, the same explanation also predicts that
there should be no di®erence in the quitting rate between TPT and QD, which is contrary to the data
(29% and 17% are statistically di®erent). In addition, the complexity explanation implies that quitting
rate and F
w should be positively correlated within each treatment condition. This is not supported by
the data: The correlation between quitting and F
w is -0.21 for TPT and 0.53 for QD. Hence the results
are mixed and we conclude that complexity does not explain the observed empirical regularities.20
explained why in our data wholesale price is higher than marginal cost of production.
However, in the model below we show that this argument does not hold.
Consider a model in which the the manufacturer's and the retailer's utilities are
weighted sums of the manufacturer and the retailer pro¯ts.14 Speci¯cally, we have:
UM = µ ¢ ¼M +( 1¡ µ) ¢ ¼R
UR = ½ ¢ ¼R +( 1¡ ½) ¢ ¼M
where 0 · µ · 1a n d0· ½ · 1 are the degree of other-regarding behavior for man-
ufacturer and retailer respectively. In this setup, we show that it is optimal for the
manufacturer to set the wholesale price to the marginal cost (See Appendix A). The ba-
sic idea is that the manufacturer prefers to achieve the maximum possible surplus even
with fairness concerns by charging c. The fairness concerns a®ect only the division of
surplus but not the total surplus.
6.2 Non-Linear Risk Attitude
The retailer faces no risk because everything is known with certainty when she makes the
participation and pricing decisions. Some uncertainty however exists for the manufac-
turer. When making his pricing decisions, the manufacturer may not know the retailer's
reservation utility for certain. Thus one may wonder whether the manufacturer's risk
attitude will lead to the observed departure of wholesale price from the marginal cost of
production. Here, we relax the risk neutrality assumption.
Let UR(¼R) be the retailer's utility as a function of her pro¯t. Let Á denote the
probability that the retailer rejects a two-part tari® contract (w;F):






) ¡ F] · V )
14There are other speci¯cations to incorporate fairness. A general speci¯cation of fairness may incor-
porate three plausible behavioral assumptions: 1. people care about their own payo®s, 2. people dislike
to be behind (i.e., envy) and 3. people dislike being ahead (i.e., guilt). We leave this for future research.21
where V is uncertain from the manufacturer's perspective.
Let UM(¼M) be the manufacturer's utility as a function of his pro¯t. Then, the
manufacturer's expected utility of o®ering a contract (w;F)i sa sf o l l o w s :




Under this setup, we show that the equilibrium wholesale price still equals the marginal
cost (See Appendix A). The basic idea is that if the manufacturer is risk-averse and cares
about retailer participation, he can increase the participation probability by lowering
the franchise fee without changing the wholesale price. So, relaxing risk neutrality does
not help to explain the empirical regularity that the wholesale price is higher than the
marginal cost.
6.3 Irrational Retailers
Another competing explanation is that the retailer population consists of a mixture of
\irrational" and \rational" players (c.f., Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2004). The irrational
retailers choose randomly between prices from wholesale price and the maximum price
(that yields zero demand) giving an average retail price of w+d
2 . The rational retailers
choose rationally as before. In this setup, the irrational retailers choose the same average
price as the rational retailers. Consequently, the risk-neutral manufacturer will choose
the optimal two-part tari® contracts as before.
7 Conclusions and Discussions
This paper is the ¯rst experimental test of channel coordinating pricing contracts. We
investigate the two-part tari® and quantity discount pricing formats. Standard economic
theories predict the two contracts are equivalent: 1) both fully restore channel e±ciency,
2) they lead to the same level of channel e±ciency, and 3) they divide the total surplus
between the parties in the same way.22
All three properties did not hold in our experimental data. Both two-part tari®
(TPT) and quantity-discount (QD) scheme fail to solve the double-marginalization prob-
lem. Interestingly, QD signi¯cantly outperforms TPT in terms of revenue generation,
thereby violating the revenue equivalence property. Also, TPT and QD are not division
equivalent: The manufacturer obtains a higher share of channel pro¯t under QD than
under TPT.
We propose a reference-dependent utility model to account for the main empirical
regularities. If the reference point is ¯xed at the status quo level, then the franchise fee in
a two-part tari® contract may be framed as loss, and the subsequent contribution margin
as gain. The resulting equilibrium is thus a function of the degree of loss aversion: The
more loss averse the retailer is, the higher the wholesale price and retail price, the lower
the franchise fee, the less e±cient the channel is, and the smaller share the manufacturer
captures in the channel pro¯t. On the other hand, the quantity-discount scheme is not
subject to loss aversion because there is no ¯xed fee and the cost to the retailer is framed
in per unit term and is naturally incorporated as part of the contribution margin.
The proposed model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood method. The stan-
dard economic models assuming gain-loss symmetry are strongly rejected. Indeed, the
loss aversion coe±cient is found to be 1.6 in the TPT treatment. Put di®erently, $1 in
t h e¯ x e df e ep a y m e n ti se q u i v a l e n tt o$ 1 . 6i nu n i tc o s tp a y m e n t .T h i si ss i m i l a rt ot h e
loss-aversion coe±cient of about 2 documented in previous studies.
Several directions for future research are possible. First, other pricing formats, such
as blocked tari®s and all-unit quantity discount schemes, can be investigated. Second,
our proposed model can be extended by incorporating some dynamics. For example, the
reference point may evolve over time, and the loss aversion coe±cient itself may change as
time goes on. One way to do this is to allow a dynamic reference point and reservation
utility that depend on past payo®s of the subjects. Third, our model cannot explain
why the loss coe±cient parameter is 1.22 rather than 1 in the QD condition. It will be
interesting to explore this \anomaly" in the future.23
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8 Appendix A: Proof of Propositions
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The manufacturer chooses a franchise fee such that the retailer's IR constraint is just
binding, hence F =
(d¡w)2
4¸ ¡ V













((d ¡ w)(1 ¡
1
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(d ¡ c) < 0
At the same time, the curvature of the manufacturer pro¯t function is determined by:
SOC :
@2 ¼M






) < 0( given¸ ¸ 1)
meaning that the curve is uniformly concave. Hence the optimal w c a nb es o l v e db y
equating the FOC to 0:
w
¤ =
(¸ ¡ 1)d + ¸c
2¸ ¡ 1
The equilibrium values of F, p, q and pro¯ts are then derived from w¤.26
8.2 Proof of Equilibrium Two-part Tari® Contract with Fair-
ness Concerns
We ¯rst show that w = c induces the retail price that maximizes channel pro¯t. Assume
a general demand function D(p). Given a two-part tari® contract, ¼M =( w¡c)D(p)+F,
and ¼R =( p ¡ w)D(p) ¡ F. The retailer's optimization problem is
max
p UR = ½ ¢ ¼R +( 1¡ ½) ¢ ¼M






+( 1¡ ½) £
d¼M
dp
However, at w = c, ¼M = F, and hence
d¼M






where ½ ¸ 0 by assumption. Also, ¼R =( p¡c)D(p)¡F at w = c,s ot h a t
d¼R
dp is exactly
the FOC of retail price for the channel. Consequently, the utility maximizing retailer
ends up maximizing the channel pro¯t given w = c.
Next, we show that the manufacturer always prefers a larger channel pro¯t. Suppose
not, and that in equilibrium ¼T <¼ E
T ,w h e r e¼E
T denotes the integrated channel pro¯t.
Given that manufacturer utility is the weighed sum of ¼M and ¼R,a tl e a s to n ep r o ¯ t
is associated with positive weight. Then increase this pro¯t by ¼E
T ¡ ¼T > 0, and the
manufacturer is strictly better o®.
Combining the above two arguments, in equilibrium w¤ = c.
8.3 Proof of Equilibrium Two-part Tari® Contract with Non-
linear Risk Attitudes
The manufacturer's optimization problem is27
max
(w;F)
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@F = 0, the ¯rst-order conditions are simpli¯ed as:
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Now we analyze the quitting probability Á. Assume V to follow a distribution with


































Combining equations (*) and (**), we get the result that in equilibrium w¤ = c.Appendix B: Sample Instructions (TPT) 
 
Thank you for participating in this decision-making experiment. The instructions are simple; if 
you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of 
money which will be paid to you in cash before you leave today.   
 
As you entered this room, you were randomly assigned a number, which would be your ID 
number throughout this experiment. The experiment will consist of 11 decision rounds. In each 
round, you will be randomly and anonymously matched with a different partner. You are not 
going to be matched with anyone twice. In each round, you can either be a RED or a BLUE 
player, which is determined randomly and will be announced at the beginning of that round. 
Please record your role (either RED or BLUE) in the “Your role (RED/BLUE)” column of Table 
2. 
 
The decisions needed to be made by you, the players, are outlined as follows. The RED player is 
to choose a price at which to sell products to the BLUE player, and to decide on a lump sum 
fixed fee asked from BLUE. BLUE in turn must decide whether she accepts this offer, and if she 
does, at what price she wants to sell these products to a group of customers. All these decisions 




The following procedural steps will be repeated in each of the decision rounds you participate in.   
 
Step 1: (RED makes decisions while BLUE sits still) 
 
RED moves first and chooses a RED PRICE (an integer) between 0 and 10. Also, RED need to 
decide on a lump sum FIXED FEE he would ask from BLUE. For each unit sold to BLUE, the 
cost to RED is 2, hence RED will make a point earning of (RED PRICE – 2) per unit sold. The 
total number of units sold (QUANTITY) depends on the decision of BLUE, which is described in 
step 2. 
 
Each RED player, please write down your chosen price in the “RED PRICE” column of Table 2, 
and your choice of FIXED FEE in the “FIXED FEE” column. The administrator will walk up to 
you, record the RED PRICE and the FIXED FEE, and then show them to your anonymous BLUE 
partner. 
 
Step 2: (BLUE makes decisions while RED sits still) 
 
After knowing from the administrator the RED PRICE and FIXED FEE charged by her 
anonymous RED partner, each BLUE player can choose to quit that round by not buying 
anything from RED. In that case, this round ends and both RED and BLUE get 0. If BLUE 
chooses to still buy from RED, she then need to decide on a BLUE PRICE (an integer) between 0 
and 10 to sell the products to the customers. Depending on the chosen BLUE PRICE, the QUANTITY of the products sold varies as given in Table 1. For example, if the BLUE PRICE is 
5, the QUANTITY sold is 5. Similarly, if the BLUE PRICE is 9, the QUANTITY sold is 1. 
 
Each BLUE player, please put YES in the “Quit?” column of Table 2 in you choose not to buy 
from RED, and put NO otherwise. If you put NO, write down your price decision in the “BLUE 
PRICE” column. The administrator will walk up to you, record your decision on whether to quit 




Up till now each player will have known RED PRICE, FIXED FEE, BLUE’s decision on 
whether to quit, and BLUE PRICE if BLUE chooses not to quit for the current round. Based on 
these decisions, each player will be able to calculate the QUANTITY sold and his/her point 
earnings of this round. 
 
If BLUE chooses to quit, then QUANTITY will be 0. Also, the point earnings for both RED and 
BLUE are 0. If BLUE chooses not to quit, then: 
 
BLUE’s point earning is equal to (BLUE PRICE – RED PRICE)  ×  QUANTITY – FIXED FEE. 
That is, the difference between the price she charges customers and the price she buys the 
product from RED times the quantity sold, and reduced by the fixed fee paid to RED. 
 
RED’s point earning is equal to (RED PRICE – 2)  × QUANTITY + FIXED FEE. That is, the 
difference between the price RED charges and the unit cost of the product times the quantity sold, 
and finally plus the fixed fee collected from BLUE. 
 
Each player, please record the QUANTITY sold and your point earnings of this round in the 
corresponding columns of Table 2.  
 
You will repeat the above task for each decision round, only with reassignment of your role 
(RED/BLUE) and with a different partner each time. Final Dollar Payoffs 
 
We will sum up your point earnings in all rounds to determine your dollar payoff. Your dollar 
payoff is your total point earnings times $0.2. That is, each point you earn is worth 20 cents. We 




To make sure you understand the procedures correctly, let’s do a small exercise before we 
actually begin the experiment. Please fill in the blanks below and compare your solutions with 
the right answer to be announced later. 
 
If in a certain round RED PRICE is 3, BLUE PRICE is 5, the FIXED FEE asked from RED is 4, 
and if BLUE chooses not to quit, then QUANTITY is ____. It follows that BLUE earns ____ 
points, and that RED earns ____ points.   
 
If in another round RED PRICE is 4, BLUE PRICE is 9, the FIXED FEE asked from RED is 2, 
and if BLUE chooses not to quit, then QUANTITY is ____. It follows that BLUE earns ____ 
points, and that RED earns ____ points.   
 
If in another round RED PRICE is 5, and RED asks a FIXED FEE of 5, and if BLUE decides to 
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Unless BLUE quits that round (where both RED and BLUE get 0), 
BLUE point earnings = (BLUE PRICE – RED PRICE)  ×  QUANTITY – FIXED FEE   
RED point earnings = (RED PRICE – 2)  ×  QUANTITY + FIXED FEE if you are RED TABLE 1:     PREDICTIONS OF STANDARD ECONOMIC THEORY
Variables             Treatment Conditions
LP TPT QD
w 622
F ---- 16-V 16-V
p 866
manufacturer profit 8 16-V 16-V
retailer profit 4 V V
channel profit 12 16 16
channel efficiency (%) 75 100 100
Note 1: The parameter values are chosen such that q=10-p, and that c=2.
Note 2: V denotes retailer's reservation utility.TABLE 2:     SUBJECT DECISIONS
Variables              Treatment Conditions
LP TPT QD
N=143 N=132 N=132
w 5.47 4.05 3.20
(.95) (1.29) (1.43)
F ---- 4.61 7.45
---- (2.04) (5.10)
quit (%) 6.29 28.79 17.42
(24.37) (45.45) (38.08)
p (conditional on participation) 7.75 6.82 6.83
(.69) (.59) (.62)
Note: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.TABLE 3:     REVENUE AND DIVISION EQUIVALENCE
Variables             Treatment Conditions
LP TPT QD
Entire sample N=143 N=132 N=132
M profit / channel profit (%) 57.40 61.57 64.79
(11.69) (11.22) (11.41)
channel profit 11.67 10.67 12.33
(3.71) (6.86) (5.77)
channel efficiency (%) 72.95 66.71 77.04
(23.22) (42.87) (36.09)
Conditional on participation N=134 N=94 N=109
M profit / channel profit (%) 57.90 66.25 67.91
(11.91) (10.02) (10.08)
channel profit 12.46 14.99 14.93
(2.21) (.94) (1.12)
channel efficiency (%) 77.85 93.68 93.29
(13.83) (5.90) (7.00)
Note 1: Values in parentheses represent standard deviations.
Note 2: In cases where the retailer quits, M profit / channel profit is regarded as 0.5.TABLE 4a:    TESTS OF SUBJECT DECISIONS AGAINST STANDARD PREDICTIONS
Condition Variables Mean Test Value t-statistic p-value
LP w 5.47 2 43.75 .000
6 -6.70 .000
quit (%) 6.29 0 3.09 .002
p (conditional on participation) 7.75 6 29.53 .000
8 -4.15 .000
TPT w 4.05 2 18.23 .000
6 -17.42 .000
F 4.61 16 -64.03 .000
quit (%) 28.79 0 7.28 .000
p (conditional on participation) 6.82 6 13.56 .000
8 -19.54 .000
QD w 3.20 2 9.60 .000
6 -22.48 .000
F 7.45 16 -19.25 .000
quit (%) 17.42 0 5.26 .000
p (conditional on participation) 6.83 6 14.14 .000
8 -19.74 .000TABLE 4b:     TESTS OF DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION, FULL EFFICIENCY, REVENUE EQUIVALENCE, AND DIVISION EQUIVALENCE
LP and Double Marginalization
Null t-statistic p-value
Entire sample Efficiency(LP)=75% -1.06 .292
Efficiency(LP)=100% -13.93 .000



























Entire sample M's profit share(TPT)=M's profit share(QD) -2.31 .022
Conditional on participation M's profit share(TPT)=M's profit share(QD) -1.17 .243TABLE 5:     MODEL ESTIMATION RESULTS 
                    






Parameters       Full
Model 
  V =0  Full
Model 
λ =1  V =0  λ =1 
V =0 
    Full
Model 
λ =1  V =0  λ =1 
V =0 
Retailer  λ                         -- --  1.57 -- 1.75 --  1.22 -- 1.35 --
                           
                     
                         
-- --  (.08) -- (.04) -- (.03) -- (.03) --
  V   2.20 --  1.28 8.86 -- --  1.51 3.44 -- --
  (.28) --  (.55) (.18) -- -- (.27) (.26) -- --
  U σ                        
                           
.84 2.38  2.48 100* 2.61 6.52  .56 1.67 .77 4.04
(.21) (.45)  (.25) (0) (.32) (.87) (.14) (.40) (.27) (.79)
Manufacturer  w σ                        
                           
                     
                         
1.08 1.08  1.29 2.41 1.33 2.42  1.43 1.86 1.49 1.86
(.06) (.06)  (.08) (.27) (.08) (.61) (.11) (.27) (.12) (.28)
  F σ   -- --  2.04 3.25 2.04 11.57  5.14 7.21 5.08 9.95
  -- --  (.14) (.48) (.14) (3.87) (.35) (1.11) (.31) (1.97)
  wF ρ                        
                         
                           
-- --  -.78 -.92 -.77 -.91  -.91 -.95 -.87 -.91
  -- --  (.04) (.02) (.04) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.03)
LL -229.93 -235.33 -510.84 -614.26 -516.36 -769.61 -539.54 -621.45 -558.81 -693.83
B.I.C.                           
                         
                        
237.37 240.30 525.49 626.46 528.57 779.37 554.18 633.65 571.01 703.59
Wald  Chi-square -- 62.16 -- 56.12 5.51  746.15 -- 43.67 31.51 258.97
P-value -- .000 -- .000 .019 .000  -- .000 .000 .000
 
Values in parentheses represent standard errors.  
All estimates are statistically significant at p = 0.05 
* Standard deviation was capped at 100. TABLE 6:     DATA VERSUS BEST FITTED VALUES OF THE REFERENCE-DEPENDENCE MODEL
Variables                            Treatment Conditions
                          TPT                        QD
Data Best Fitted Values Data Best Fitted Values
w 4.05 4.13 3.20 3.22
F 4.61 4.65 7.45 8.17
quit (%) 28.79 34.85 17.42 18.94
p (conditional on participation) 6.82 7.06 6.83 6.61FIGURE 1: FULL EFFICIENCY, REVENUE EQUIVALENCE, 
AND DIVISION EQUIVALENCE HYPOTHESES 
 
 



































 FIGURE 2: PREDICTIONS OF THE REFERENCE DEPENDENT MODEL  
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